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Abstract
Web applications suffer from software and conﬁguration
faults that lower their availability. Recovering from failure
is dominated by the time interval between when these faults
appear and when they are detected by site operators. We in-
troduce a set of tools that augment the ability of operators
to perceive the presence of failure: an automatic anomaly
detector scours HTTP access logs to ﬁnd changes in user
behavior that are indicative of site failures, and a visualizer
helps operators rapidly detect and diagnose problems. Vi-
sualization addresses a key question of autonomic comput-
ing of how to win operators’ conﬁdence so that new tools
will be embraced. Evaluation performed using HTTP logs
from Ebates.com demonstrates that these tools can enhance
the detection of failure as well as shorten detection time.
Our approach is application-generic and can be applied to
any Web application without the need for instrumentation.
1. Introduction
Web applications are becoming increasingly complex
and hard to manage. In particular, non-failstop application-
level faults that cause user-visible failures are hard to detect
without special case checks, yet they have a ﬁrst-order im-
pact on the user’s experience that may result in temporary
or permanent site abandonment. As much as 75% of time
spent recovering from these failures is spent just detecting
them [4]. Although a new focus on statistical anomaly de-
tection and pattern recognition [10] promises to reduce the
manual conﬁguration and tuning required by current mon-
itoring tools, statistical techniques invariably suffer from
falsepositives(andsometimesfalsenegatives), reducingthe
operator’s conﬁdence in the monitoring system.
Rather than ignoring this fundamental trust issue and
removing the human from the loop, we believe a more
promising path is an operator-aware division of labor for
detecting such failures. To the computer we assign what the
computer does best: statistical analysis of log data. For the
human operator, we provide a tool to help bring her system
experienceandexpertisetobearoninterpretingandreacting
to the alarms raised by the analysis engines; speciﬁcally, we
provide rich visualizations of trafﬁc information that allow
her to quickly spot the sources of potential problems and to
cross-check the reports of the statistical analysis tools. By
taking advantage of the fact that human beings are excel-
lent performers at visual pattern recognition, visualization
helps the operator interpret failure alarms and identify their
possible causes as well as keeping the effective cost of false
alarms low by allowing her to rapidly identify them as such.
In determining what kind of analysis to perform on
site logs, we observe that the site’s end users are excel-
lent “detectors” of site failures, in that their behavior typ-
ically changes when they encounter a malfunction. For ex-
ample, if the link from the /shopping cart page to the
/checkout page is broken, users simply can’t reach the
/checkout page. Similarly, if a particular page does not
load or render properly, users might click “Reload” several
times to try to ﬁx the problem. Since such behaviors are
captured in HTTP logs, we can build statistical models of
normal access patterns and then detect anomalies in user
behavior. Since HTTP logs are application-generic, our ap-
proach can be applied to other Web applications without
additional instrumentation.
Contributions
We present a visualization tool that allows operators to
quickly spot anomalies or possible problems on their site in
real time as well as conﬁrm or investigate problem alarms
reported by automated detection systems. To illustrate the
latter ability, we apply some relatively well-known anomaly
detection techniques to spot non-failstop failures in server
logs from a real mid-sized Internet site Ebates.com; the ba-
sic insight is to look for anomalous patterns in end-users’behavior as possible indicators of a failure. The information
from these anomaly detectors is fed to the visualization tool,
allowing the operator to visually inspect the anomaly in the
context of previous and current trafﬁc patterns and correlate
the anomaly-score information to the trafﬁc timeline. Un-
like traditional visualization systems whose structure often
reﬂects the architecture of the system, our tool visualizes
metrics derived from users’ site-visit behavior, which the
site operators can more readily understand. We ﬁnd that the
use of the combined visualization and analysis tools would
have allowed Ebates operators to detect and localize many
actual site problems hours or days earlier than they actually
did.
We make the following speciﬁc contributions:
• We use information-rich visualization to address the
problem of operator trust in statistical learning algo-
rithms. The synergy of visualization and automatic de-
tection allows an operator to use human pattern match-
ing to easily verify the warnings produced by our mon-
itoring system.
• We monitor user behavior and automatically detect
anomalies when the site is available but individ-
ual applications or functionalities are beginning to
fail. This allowed us to quickly detect and help lo-
calize application-level failures from a real system:
Ebates.com.
• Visualization of information was not based on systems
architecture, which is the norm, but on metrics based
on “black-box” user behavior. These user-oriented
metrics offer greater insight into the status of the site
and match our statistical algorithms. This match builds
the trust relationship. Since our approach uses just
HTTP logs to monitor user behavior, it can be used
with any Web application.
Section 2 outlines our approach to combining visualiza-
tion with automatic statistical anomaly detection. Section 3
describes the details of the algorithms themselves, our ex-
perimental setup and methodology, and evaluation metrics.
Section 4 presents the results of applying our tools to real
datasets, concentrating on the relative strengths and weak-
nesses of the different algorithms and the use of visualiza-
tion to allow the operator to rapidly bring her experience
and judgment into play to resolve ambiguities in failure re-
porting across the different algorithms. Section 5 discusses
salient aspects of our results in light of our goal—helping
the operator work more efﬁciently with automated detection
techniques—and draws some tentative conclusions about
implications for continuing work in this area. We then re-
view some related work, outline possible future directions,
and conclude.
2. Approach: Combining Anomaly Detection
and Visualization
Our anomaly detection approach is relatively simple: we
chose to look for abrupt changes in hit frequencies to the
top 40 pages (which cover about 98% of trafﬁc at Ebates).
Fundamentally, this problem involves learning a baseline of
hit frequencies, detecting deviations (anomalies) from that
baseline, and determining the extent to which a “long lived”
anomaly should inﬂuence the baseline (i.e., the sensitivity
with which the baseline itself shifts in response to recent
and/or anomalous data). Furthermore, when an anomalous
frequency shift is detected, we need to localize the problem,
i.e. determine which page(s) are most likely implicated as
causing the anomaly.
To perform this analysis we use two statistical meth-
ods: Naive Bayes classiﬁcation and the χ2 (Chi-square)
test. (The details of these algorithms are described in sec-
tion 3). Other anomaly detection methods such as Support
Vector Machines may perform better, but they don’t allow
us to easily determine which pages are the most anomalous.
On the other hand, both Naive Bayes and χ2 allow us to
quantify the anomaly for each page.
While these techniques are useful for their ability to
identify patterns in large amounts of data, as Hamming has
said, “The purpose of computation is insight, not numbers.”
We augment the tools with information visualization, “the
use of computer-supported, interactive, visual representa-
tions of abstract nonphysically-based data to amplify cog-
nition”, which has been shown to reduce the mental effort
required to do search, recognition, and inference in connec-
tion with problem solving (see the ﬁrst chapter of [2] for
numerous examples).
The tool we built provides a compact and information-
rich visual representation of: a) trafﬁc to the 40 most re-
quested pages, and b) transitions from and to these top 40
pages in user sessions. Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the
main visualization interface of the tool. Instead of simply
reporting detected anomaly at 3:25pm, the operator
can immediately see the historic and current trafﬁc patterns
to conﬁrm the anomaly. The tool also provides a simple
interface for manual inspection of trafﬁc patterns.
The emphasis on “live” interaction with the data distin-
guishes visualization from static graphical presentation. In
our case, the operator can drill down on one of the visually-
obvious trafﬁc anomalies in Figure 1 to examine the page-
transition rates during the anomalous interval, as shown in
Figure 2.
The anomaly detection algorithms mentioned previously
also feed information to the visualization tool. As we
will describe, the algorithms report about once a minute
on whether anomalous behavior was detected during that
minute. To avoid bombarding the operator with alarmsFigure 1. An annotated screen shot of the visualization tool. (Note: if possible, ﬁgures 1, 2, and 3 should be viewed in color.)
The horizontal axis is time in 5-minute intervals. Each horizontal bar represents the hit count to one of the 40 most-requested pages;
the bottom bar counts hits to all other pages combined. A blue tile means the corresponding page received > 100 hits during that
5-minute interval; green > 10 hits, yellow > 1 hit, white (no tile) zero hits. The graph on the top shows the corresponding anomaly
scores. In this screenshot we clearly see two anomalies from data set 1: A (1:49pm to 1:58pm) and B (7:24pm to 9:05pm).
for anomalies that persist over several minutes, consecu-
tive anomalies after the ﬁrst are grouped into a single warn-
ing. In addition, for each warning the tool reports the most
anomalous pages, as scored by the anomaly detection algo-
rithms, and the change in transition rates to and from the
most anomalous pages; this information may help the oper-
ator localize the cause of the problem. For example, if the
operator clicks on the “Warnings” tab in Figure 1 after se-
lecting the anomaly marked as B in the ﬁgure, the Warning
panel will display the following:
warning #2: detected on Sun Nov 16 19:27:00
start: Sun Nov 16 19:24:00 PST 2003
end: Sun Nov 16 21:05:00 PST 2003
anomaly score = 7.03
Most anomalous pages: anomaly score:
/landing.jsp 19.55
/landing_merchant.jsp 19.50
/mall_ctrl.jsp 3.69
change in transitions FROM /landing.jsp
page: before: after:
/landing_merchant.jsp 37.13% 93.17%
/mall_ctrl.jsp 21.85% 0.83%Figure 2. Page transitions from /landing -
merchant.jsp page during the anomaly B in data set 1,
in 1-minute intervals. A sudden increase of transitions to
/landing.jsp (the topmost row) at 7:24pm is evident
from the ﬁgure. This represents an alternate view of part of
the time period from Figure 1.
3. Test Data and Methodology
In this section we describe the HTTP logs we analyzed,
give details of the analysis algorithms, and describe our
evaluation methodology before proceeding to experimental
results.
3.1. HTTP Access Logs
A typical three-tier Internet application consists of a tier
of Web servers, a tier of application logic servers, and a
tier of persistent storage servers. Popular Web servers in-
clude Apache and Microsoft IIS; application servers may be
framework-based, such as Java 2 Enterprise Edition (J2EE)
servers, or custom-written in-house; persistence may be
provided by a database such as Oracle or MySQL or by a
ﬁle server.
Ebates.com provided us with 5 sets of (anonymized) ac-
cesslogsrecordedbytheWebservertier. Eachsetconsisted
of HTTP trafﬁc to 3 Web servers during a contiguous time
period ranging from 7 to 16 days. Each period contains at
least one web application failure as well as signiﬁcant inter-
vals of “normal” application behavior. The access logs con-
tained the following information about every user request:
Apache server’s time stamp, local URL of page accessed,
URL parameters (parts of the URL passed as parameters to
scripts on active pages), session ID, application server that
served the request, and anonymized user ID.
3.2. Analysis Using χ2-test
Intuitively, we might expect that under normal condi-
tions, vectors of page hit counts collected during differ-
ent time intervals should come from the same distribution,
or more generally, a vector of hit counts collected during
the current time interval should come from the same dis-
tribution as the “historical norm.” The χ2-test [12] can
be used to compute the probability that two data vectors
A = (a1,...,an) and B = (b1,...,bn) come from differ-
ent distributions; it has been used, e.g., to detect anomalies
in network trafﬁc [14].
The test is performed in the following way:
1. Let Sa =
Pn
i=1 ai, Sb =
Pn
i=1 bi, and si = ai + bi.
2. Compute the expected value for each ai and bi: EA
i =
siSa/(Sa + Sb), EB
i = siSb/(Sa + Sb).
3. Compute the total χ2 value of the two vectors: χ2 = Pn
i=1(ai − EA
i )2/EA
i + (bi − EB
i )2/EB
i .
4. Compute the signiﬁcance s of the test using the χ2 dis-
tribution with n − 1 degrees of freedom.
5. Finally, an anomaly score is computed as −log(1−s).
From the access logs, we ﬁrst identify the N most popu-
lar (by hit count) pages of the site (we used N = 40). We
compute the vector C = (c1,...,c40) of hit rates to each
of these pages during the current time interval and compare
it to the “historically normal” vector H = (h1,...,h40) of
hit rates for the same pages. Since different types of trafﬁc
anomalies may take different amounts of time to become
evident, we consider time intervals varying in length from
1 to 20 minutes. Since by deﬁnition the χ2 test is not valid
if each page didn’t receive at least 5 hits, we exclude pages
with fewer than 5 hits. The actual algorithm, run once per
minute, is as follows (let t be the current time):
1. compute the historic trafﬁc pattern H over all previous
data, excluding time intervals marked as anomalous.
(Initially, we assume all intervals are normal.)
2. for every t0 ∈ {1,2,...,20}:
(a) compute current trafﬁc pattern C from time in-
terval ht − t0,ti
(b) compare C and H using the χ2-test. If the sig-
niﬁcance of the test is higher than 0.99, mark the
interval ht − t0,ti as anomalous.
When a period is declared anomalous, we assign an
anomaly score to each page based on that page’s contri-
bution to the total χ2 value: ((ci − EC
i )2/EC
i + (hi −
EH
i )2/EH
i ).We also detect signiﬁcant changes in page transitions
that occurred when the anomaly started. We compare the
trafﬁcbeforetheanomaly(timeintervalht0−t,t0i, wheret0
is the start of the anomaly) and during the anomaly (ht0,t1i,
where t1 is current time). Thus, every minute of an anoma-
lous trafﬁc we compare the transitions to and from the top
40 pages before and during the anomaly using the χ2-test.
3.3. Analysis Using Naive Bayes Classiﬁer
The second type of analysis involves training a Naive
Bayes classiﬁer [6] to detect anomalies. Again, we use the
access logs to compute the hits per unit time to each of the
top N pages on the site, (c1,...,cN), during the current
time interval. The ci’s are normalized by dividing by the to-
tal hit count during the interval so that they are in the range
of 0 to 1. We also compute the combined hit frequency to
all remaining pages on the site and the difference in total hit
count between the previous time period and the current one.
By using the Naive Bayes model we make an (incorrect)
simplifying assumption that all the 42 (=N +2) features are
conditionally independent. However, Naive Bayes is very
often successfully used in practice even though this theoret-
ical requirement is rarely satisﬁed.
We divide time into 10-minute time intervals and use this
classiﬁer to determine whether the current time interval is
normal (S = s+) or anomalous (S = s−). The conditional
probability of each feature fi given S = s+ is modeled by
a Gaussian distribution whose mean µi and variance σ2
i are
estimated for each feature using maximum-likelihood esti-
mation from the previous time intervals.
Ifweknewaprioriwhichtimeintervalswereanomalous
and which were normal (in the parlance of machine learn-
ing, if we had labeled data), it would be trivial to calculate
the mean and variance of p(fj|S = s+) and p(fj|S = s−)
using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). However, as
is typical for real systems, our data is unlabeled (i.e. we
don’t know which periods are anomalous) so we have to
do unsupervised learning. In the absence of labeled exam-
ples of s−, we choose to model the conditional probability
p(fj|S = s−) using a uniform distribution over the range of
possible values (i.e., 0 to 1).
The standard approach of using Expectation Maximiza-
tion (EM) to simultaneously learn the value of s and p(f|s)
is too slow for real-time use on high-volume data, so we
approximate it with two separate methods:
• Unweighted learning (Eager NB): We estimate µi and
σ2
i with the assumption that every previous time inter-
val is normal, i.e. we “label” every previous interval
as S = s+. This is a reasonable ﬁrst-order assump-
tion as long as the majority of states are in fact normal,
in other words, as long as failures are rare. However,
if an anomaly occurs and persists, this technique will
quickly “adjust” to the anomaly by treating it as nor-
mal. We therefore call this an “eager” learner.
• Probabilistically-weighted learning (Careful NB): In
estimating µi and σ2
i , we weight each past time in-
terval by the probability that it is normal. Thus, the
more anomalous a time interval appears, the less it
is incorporated into the model of normal behavior.
This method will continue to detect an anomaly even
when it persists for a long time, but if the long-lived
“anomaly” is in fact a new steady state, it will take
longer for this method to adjust to it. We therefore call
this a “careful” learner.
In our Naive Bayes approach, we don’t learn the prior prob-
abilities of normal and anomalous time intervals. Instead,
we use the priors as a parameter that trades off between a
low false positive rate (for low Prob(anomalous)) and a
high anomaly detection rate (for high Prob(anomalous)).
The classiﬁer reports an anomaly score for each time pe-
riod; this score is calculated as −log(Prob(f|normal))/n,
where n is the number of features used. To local-
ize the most likely features that caused the anomaly,
we assign an anomaly score to each feature fi as
−log(Prob(fi|normal)).
Note that in many cases, the judgment of whether a long-
lived anomaly is in fact a new steady state may require oper-
ator intervention. Therefore, rather than trying to automati-
cally determine this, we allow the operator to visualize both
the raw data and the anomaly scores over time reported by
each algorithm.
3.4. Methodology
The logs we received were collected in the past, and the
failure incidents reﬂected in them had already been diag-
nosed and dealt with. Our methodology therefore consisted
of the following steps:
1. With little or no knowledge of what events occurred in
a data set, run our detection algorithms. For each data
set, the models were initialized as untrained at the be-
ginning of the data set and learned in an online fashion.
2. For each anomalous period (and some normal regions
as well), examine the trafﬁc patterns during that pe-
riod using our visualization tool in conjunction with
the graphs of anomaly scores reported by our anomaly
detectors.
3. Use the visualizations and graphs to discuss each re-
ported incident with the CTO and operations engineers
at Ebates to reconstruct “what really happened” during
that incident as completely as possible.4. Based on these discussions, classify each reported
anomaly as either a true positive, a false positive
(clearly attributable to a non-fault event, such as a
failure-free update to the Web site), or a possible false
positive (one we could not attribute to an event, or
more often, that we could attribute but we could not
unambiguously determine whether or not the associ-
ated event was a failure).
5. Based on these discussions, determine how much
sooner a site failure could have been detected or pre-
vented had our tools been in place at the time of the
incident.
3.5. Evaluation Metrics
Traditionally, failure detection is evaluated in terms of
precision and time-to-detection. Precision is deﬁned as true
positives divided by all positives, i.e., TP/(TP + FP),
where true positives are the number of actual failures de-
tected and false positives the number of identiﬁed events
that are not failures. However, in dealing with real data
from a complex service, these metrics are problematic.
First, part of the motivation behind our work is precisely
thatexistingdetectiontechniquesdonot detectcertainkinds
of fail-stop failures. Hence, in cross-checking our results
against the best knowledge available to the operations staff,
wedonothave100%certaintythatthelistofknownfailures
is exhaustive. Second, some false positives are attributed
to non-fault events that result in a change in user behavior,
or events that cause bona ﬁde performance anomalies that
are nonfatal under moderate load (for example) but lead to
user-visible failure under heavier load. To be conservative,
we count such incidents as “false positives” in our evalu-
ation. Finally, the notion of “time to detect” presupposes
that there exists an instant in time before which there was
no failure and after which there was unambiguously a fail-
ure. For non-failstop failures, especially those that mani-
fest only under increased load, it is unclear how to choose
this moment. Furthermore, even if we could assume that
the time of fault occurrence was well-deﬁned, we lack the
ground-truth knowledge to establish conclusively what that
time was.
The information we do have includes the time a par-
ticular failure was in fact detected by existing techniques
(whether automatically or manually by Ebates staff) and
the ostensible cause of the failure (localization information)
as determined by Ebates staff. When we measure true and
false positives, then, we assume the best case corresponds to
detecting all failures detected by Ebates staff and misclassi-
fying no other events. We also measure advance warning—
the amount of extra reaction time the staff would have had
because our tool identiﬁed a potential failure before the staff
did, and whether this advance warning might have helped
mitigate or avoid a failure. Finally, we ask the question:
had the staff been given the localization information pro-
vided by our algorithms, how useful would it have been in
identifying the cause of the failure? In our measurements
we report the qualitative answer, on a scale of 1 (not useful)
to 10 (vitally useful) given by Ebates staff. (We did not col-
lect localization score data on one of our algorithms, Eager
NB.)
4. Discussion of Results for Each Data Set
In this section we discuss the results of combining
anomaly detection and visualization on each of the datasets
we examined. We then summarize the overall performance
of our techniques, paying particular attention to the differ-
ences in each algorithm’s ability to detect particular fail-
ures, the role of visualization in helping the operator sort
out “what really happened”, and the implication for com-
bining both types of operator information.
4.1. Data Set 1: Account Page
The major problem that occurred during this week was
a site slowdown (and then crash) caused by the account
page. The bad account page had existed for a long time,
but this time period saw a larger-than-ever hit rate to the
page as customers logged in to check their accounts follow-
ing a quarterly mailing of rebate checks to customers. The
problem was ﬁrst detected by Ebates on Monday (Day 3 of
the data set) at approximately 6:23am, diagnosed by Ebates
at approximately 12 noon, and the offending page removed
at about 12:30pm. The problem reappeared on Day 4 from
5:38am to 7:13am as Ebates staff tried putting the page back
up, but took it down again. On Day 6 starting about 8pm,
there was massive quality assurance of this page against 2
servers on the live site to conﬁrm the ﬁx. The ﬁx was ver-
iﬁed on Day 6 at 11:21pm. Given this chronology recon-
structed from Ebates’ information, we now compare it with
the behavior of our algorithms.
Day 2. We detected a mid-size anomaly (A) on Day 2
at 1:49pm and a signiﬁcant anomaly (B) on the same day
from 7:24pm until 9:05pm, centered around two pages not
directly related to account activity. The number of hits
to these pages increased from less than 5 every minute to
about 50 hits a minute. Anomaly B can be seen on Fig-
ure 1. After zooming in on this anomaly and switching
to the transitions view (Figure 2), we can see a signiﬁcant
change in the pattern of pages an HTTP session visits im-
mediately after visiting /landing merchant.jsp. This
can be potentially very important information for the opera-
tor. We later learned that these two anomalies corresponded
to database alarms raised by Ebates’ database monitoring
system as a result of a quarterly batch job that placed aFigure 3. Visualization of the anomaly followed by a site
crash on Day 3 of data set 1. An (undiagnosed) problem
was ﬁrst detected by Ebates at 6:23am; Ebates diagnosed
the problem and removed the buggy account pages at about
12:30pm. Our algorithms detected and localized the ﬁrst
anomaly at 11:07am.
heavy load on the database. Figure 4 shows both our al-
gorithm’s anomaly scores over time, and the occurrence of
three database alarms at Ebates, for a 16-hour period in this
data set. In particular note that we detected an anomaly at
7:24pm (approximately time 700 in the graph), about 100
minutes before the third database alarm was raised. Al-
though the pages reported most anomalous are not directly
related to the account page, Ebates staff said that know-
ing about this anomaly would have put the site operators
on alert for possible problems, and may have led them to
detect the problem earlier than they did.
Day 3. The next anomaly, the largest in the data set,
starts at 11:07am on Day 3. This anomaly is presented in
Figure 3. It can be seen (and it was correctly reported by
the NB algorithm) that two of the most anomalous pages
are the account pages. At this point, Ebates staff was aware
of a performance problem, but they would not discover its
cause until 50 minutes after our anomaly warning, which
reported the two account pages as the most highly anoma-
lous. Ebates indicated that this would have been a strong
diagnostic hint to the operators and would likely have re-
duced diagnosis time.
The last signiﬁcant anomaly we detected, 7:51pm on
Day 6, was due to an intensive stress-test effort performed
on the live site to validate the ﬁx.
All three algorithms were also affected by signiﬁcant
night anomalies lasting from approximately midnight to
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Figure 4. Anomaly scores and database alarms on Day 2
of data set 1. Note that we did not detect the ﬁrst database
alarm as an anomaly.
2am on most nights. In fact, we saw these night anoma-
lies to varying degrees in all ﬁve of our data sets. For ex-
ample, you can notice the increased anomaly score around
this time period on Figure 1. We later learned that these
may have corresponded to a cache warm-up effect resulting
from a nightly cache ﬂush (of which some staff were un-
aware). There are other possible explanations for the night
anomalies, including simply higher variance due to a lower
number of total hits. We intend to further investigate this
phenomenon in the future.
In summary, the anomaly and diagnostic information
available in this case would have been helpful in diagnosing
the cause of a poorly-understood performance problem and
would have called attention to the account page problem an
hour before it was identiﬁed.
4.2. Data Set 2: Landing Loop
This data set included a site crash due to a bug whereby
a “landing page” (an entry page to the site) was incorrectly
redirecting users back to the landing page itself, resulting
in an inﬁnite loop that eventually brought down the site.
All 3 algorithms (Careful NB, Eager NB, and χ2) detected
signiﬁcant anomalies 2 days prior to Ebates’ detection of a
major problem and 21
2 days before the crash, corresponding
to the introduction of two new “landing pages” to the site.
(Note that the bug may have been introduced at this time
or at a point in the future.) All 3 algorithms also detected
signiﬁcant (and increasing) anomalies in the site beginning
several hours before the site crashed. Careful NB and Eager
NB provided localization information that the CTO rated as
an 8, on a scale of 1-10, for the usefulness this would have
had in detecting and diagnosing the problem so as to avoid7/24 7/25 7/26 7/27 7/28 7/29 7/30 7/31
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Figure 5. Anomaly scores over time for Careful NB on
data set 2, “Landing Loop”. The time period from the in-
troduction of the landing pages until Ebates’ detection of
the landing loop problem is marked as an unknown sys-
tem state, since we haven’t been able to determine with
100% certainty whether this time period was problematic
for Ebates or not.
the crash. χ2 had one (possible) false positive: the early
detection 21
2 days before the crash. Eager NB and Careful
NBeachhadtwo(possible)falsepositives. Accordingtothe
CTO, even if the initial detection 21
2 days before the crash
didnotrepresenttheonsetofthemajorbug, thewarningand
localization information provided at that time would have
beenveryhelpfulindiagnosingtheproblemwhenthemajor
failure did start to occur.
Figure 5, which shows the anomaly scores over time for
Careful NB for this data set, illustrates the effect of care-
ful learning. At the introduction of the problematic pages,
Careful NB detects a signiﬁcant change in the distribution
of the trafﬁc to the site. Because this raises the anomaly
score signiﬁcantly, Careful NB weights this time period ex-
tremely low in incorporating it into its model of “normal”.
Trafﬁc characteristics to which Careful NB is sensitive re-
main anomalous for the next two days, so Careful NB is
very slow to decide that this is in fact “normal” behavior. In
contrast, as shown in Figure 6 (which represents data set 3),
the “eager learner” Eager NB quickly concludes that a new
and different trafﬁc pattern is no longer anomalous, due its
assumption that the behavior of all previous time periods
should contribute equally to the proﬁle of “normal” behav-
ior. The third algorithm, χ2 (shown in Figure 7 for data set
5), works by detecting changes in trafﬁc patterns over rela-
tively short time periods, and therefore exhibits much more
bimodal behavior than Careful NB.
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Figure 6. Whereas “careful learner” Careful NB contin-
ues to detect the broken signup page anomaly (data set 3)
for all 7 days, “eager learner” Eager NB quickly decides
that this new behavior is normal.
4.3. Data Set 3: Broken Signup
This data set does not contain a crash, but rather an in-
complete deployment of a “new user sign up” page which
had gone undetected by Ebates operators. Served to new
users for over a week, this page displayed a blank page with
an error on it instead of the expected site content, rendering
it impossible for new users to come to the site. The problem
did not affect existing users.
Careful NB and χ2 detected the introduction of the prob-
lem 7 days before Ebates’ diagnosis. (Eager NB detected
an anomaly at this time too, but it was close to its noise
threshold, so we do not count this as a detection for Eager
NB.) Careful NB provided localization information at prob-
lem introduction time, and during the entire 7 day anomaly,
that Ebates said would have been extremely helpful in lo-
calizing the problem. Because of the length of the anomaly,
Eager NB and χ2 began to view the anomalous period as
normal, but Careful NB (the “careful learner”) continued
to report an anomaly for the entire 7 days, as seen in Fig-
ure 6. This is another example of a case in which the op-
erator’s understanding of the system would help resolve the
ambiguous result of applying algorithms that are sensitive
to different timescales.
4.4. Data Set 4: Badly Optimized Page Bug
In data set 4, a new page that invoked an inefﬁcient
database query caused a site crash when its hit rate in-
creased as a result of a large email campaign. The resulting
database overload subsequently led to site failure. Careful
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Figure 7. Anomaly scores over time for χ
2 on data set
5, “Bad URL and Runaway Query”. The major failures oc-
cured on days 4 and 10.
the crash (3 hours before Ebates staff detected the prob-
lem). The anomaly level was initially low, increasing as the
problem escalated. χ2 detected the problem 3 minutes after
Ebates staff detected the problem. Ebates staff believe they
could have avoided the crash if they had had the anomaly
localization information provided by Careful NB.
4.5. Data Set 5: Bad URL and Runaway Query
Data set 5 contained 2 signiﬁcant failures. The ﬁrst fail-
ure due to a conﬁguration error in which the ’shopping url’
for one of Ebates’ merchants was inadvertently mapped to
a popular search engine site. All Ebates users who followed
that link were instead sent back to Ebates where shopping
sessions were generated continuously and in rapid succes-
sion until the site crashed.
χ2 detected this failure 5.5 hours before Ebates could di-
agnose the problem. Both NB algorithms detected the prob-
lem at the same time, but the anomaly scores were within
the noise level, so we don’t count this in our results as a de-
tection for the NB algorithms. However, once again Ebates
staff said the localization information provided by the NB
algorithms would have been a tremendous diagnostic aid.
The second signiﬁcant failure was a runaway query caus-
ing signiﬁcant database performance problems. All three
algorithms detected this failure concurrently with Ebates’
detection. Figure 7 illustrates the χ2 algorithm’s behavior
over this data set.
4.6. Summary of Results
Table 1 summarizes the overall results of our analysis.
For ﬁve of the six major faults in our log data, at least one
Table 1. Summary of our results over all 5 data sets. For
major faults, χ
2 had a higher detection rate and fewer false
positives than Careful NB or Eager NB, but Careful NB pro-
vided more useful diagnostic information.
Major fault Careful NB Eager NB χ2
Faults Detected 5/6 4/6 6/6
Known FP’s 1 1 1
Possible FP’s 3 3 2
Detection rate 83% 67% 100%
Precision 56-83% 50-80% 67-86%
Local. score 8.6/10 n/a 4/10
Minor faults Careful NB Eager NB χ2
Faults detected 4/7 4/7 4/7
Known FP’s 3 3 0
Possible FP’s 5 4 2
Detection rate 57% 57% 57%
Precision 33-57% 36-57% 67-100%
of the algorithms detected the problem as well as provided
useful localization information prior to Ebates being able to
diagnose the problem; the sixth was detected concurrently
with its occurrence. Our algorithms performed less well on
the seven minor faults (four database alarms, one brief out-
age associated with a code push, one brief re-introduction
of a buggy page, and one massive QA effort on the live site
to verify a ﬁx). Of the three missed faults (false negatives),
two were database alarms that may not have had any dis-
cernible impact on users and the third was a brief introduc-
tion and then removal of a buggy page. The three known
false positives were all failure-free code updates to the ap-
plication. Note that we did not consider the predictable
nightly anomalies as false positives, since they were eas-
ily ﬁltered out by time. We did not perform localization or
advance-warning analysis on the minor faults.
Table 2 summarizes our results broken down by data set.
For each data set we show number of major and minor faults
detected (out of the total number of total major and minor
faults respectively); number of known false positives and
possible false positives; the advance warning time (AWT)
for major faults, i.e. how long from the time our algorithms
detected an anomaly until Ebates’ initial localization of the
related fault; and the localization score, the usefulness of di-
agnostic information as estimated by Ebates staff on a scale
of 1 to 10, lowest to highest, for the major faults. In data
set 2 we are not certain whether if that detection represents
the actual onset of the problem (see section 4.2); if not, the
detection in this data set was approximately concurrent with
Ebates’ detection.Table 2. Performance by data set, using χ
2 for detection
and Careful NB for localization.
Measure DS1 DS2 DS3 DS4 DS5 Total
Major faults 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 2/2 6/6
Minor faults 3/5 0/0 1/1 0/0 0/1 4/7
Known FP’s 0 0 1 0 0 1
Possible FP’s 0 1 1 1 1 4
AWT 1h 50h? 7d 0m 5.5h,0m avg: 37h
Local. score 8 8 9 10 8 avg: 8.6
5. Discussion: Role of the Operator
5.1. Classifying False Positives
In our experience, support from operations staff is essen-
tial for asserting the ground truth of a warning system. In
our case, we needed their help to interpret the failure data
and verify the conclusions of our anomaly detectors; but
in general, dealing with false positives may require opera-
tor intervention, since the operator(s) may be best qualiﬁed
to determine whether an anomaly, transient or long-lived,
is a true problem or a false alarm. Figure 8 illustrates the
tradeoff between early detection and false positives: the in-
troduction of a new and bug-free “Father’s Day” page to
the site caused both Careful NB and Eager NB to declare
an anomaly; Careful NB took 9 hours to decide that this
new page was not problematic, while Eager NB reached this
conclusion in only 90 minutes. Similarly, an anomaly we
detected several hours before the anomalous pages caused
a site crash might be dismissed by the operator since at the
time Ebates had just sent emails to all its customers, stimu-
lating increased site activity; but if anomalous behavior per-
sisted, the operator might realize that the localization infor-
mation could help drill down on the problem and determine
if there was really cause for concern.
5.2. Detecting Different Types of Anomalies
Naive Bayes and χ2 respond to different kinds of
changes in trafﬁc patterns and are useful for complemen-
tary tasks. Naive Bayes is sensitive to increases in fre-
quency to infrequent pages. Consider a page that normally
accounts for only 0.1% of hits to the site with variance
0.01%: since Naive Bayes models each page’s hit frequency
as a Gaussian distribution, an increase in that page to, say,
5% of page hits is modeled as extremely improbable. In
our datasets many failures were related to bugs in relatively
infrequently-accessed pages, which made NB an effective
diagnostic tool.
In contrast, the χ2 test is robust to changes in hit counts
to unpopular pages, in part because the validity of the test
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Figure 8. Differing behavior of Careful vs. Eager learn-
ing in handling false positives. Careful NB takes 9 hours to
”recover” fromthefalse positive, while EagerNB reocovers
in about 90 minutes.
requires excluding any page not receiving at least ﬁve hits
in a given time interval. This results in χ2 being more sen-
sitive to increases and decreases in frequent pages, but less
useful for precise localization: its bias toward frequently-
accessed pages often caused it to report those pages as the
most anomalous, but that is not useful since frequently-
accessed pages are generally going to be affected at some
point by most failures anyway. For this reason, the sum-
mary of per-dataset results reported in Table 2 rely on χ2 for
detection and Naive Bayes with probabilistically-weighted
learning (Careful NB) for localization.
The difference in behavior between the techniques can
be seen in Figure 9, which represents data set 4. NB is able
to detect this anomaly 3 hours before χ2, because it detects
an increase in hits to very infrequent pages. These pages
continue to increase in frequency, and 3 hours later they end
up having a major deleterious effect on the site. This causes
changes in hits to highly frequent pages, which χ2 then de-
tects. Thus, the determination of which algorithm detected
the anomaly tells the operator something about the nature of
the anomaly, and with experience, an operator could learn
to recognize “patterns” such as this one, in which detection
by one algorithm is later followed by detection by another.
Again, our contribution is the pervasive use of visualization
to take advantage of the operator’s experience with and un-
derstanding of the system as well as her ability to rapidly
absorb visually-presented information.
5.3. Reconstructing the Ground Truth
To precisely compute the accuracy, time to detect, and
falsepositive/falsenegativeratesofourtechniques, weneed
to know the “ground truth” of exactly what problems oc-0 200 400 600 800 1000
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Figure 9. Illustration of differences in detection sensi-
tivity of NB PWL and χ
2. NB PWL is more sensitive to
increases in hits to infrequent pages, which makes it able to
detect changes earlier and seems to make it a better local-
izer. χ
2 is more sensitive to changes to hits to more frequent
pages, making it less prone to false positives.
curred, when they were introduced, and when they were de-
tected. Reconstructingthisinformationrequiredthecooper-
ation of the operations staff, who even after going through
system monitor logs, email archives, and chat logs could
only partially reconstruct some of the incidents. We still
don’t know the precise time some failures were introduced
(only when they were detected by Ebates staff), and we still
cannot determine whether three of the anomalies we de-
tected really corresponded to a transient (but undetected)
site problem or were false positives. This in turn can make
it difﬁcult to determine whether an anomaly detected prior
to an actual failure was an early warning signal or an unre-
lated false alarm. We believe that this is an inherent prob-
lem of working with real-world failure data. Thus, instead
of reporting “time to detect” and “false positive rate”, we
present alternative evaluation metrics based on the amount
of advance warning provided by our tools relative to exist-
ing detection techniques used at Ebates.
5.4. Generalizing our Approach
In this work we detect problems with Web applications
by detecting anomalies in the HTTP trafﬁc to the site. These
anomalies can be caused by users when accessing a failing
service or by the service itself when requests from users are
forwarded incorrectly. We obtained the results described in
Section 4.6 by analyzing all HTTP trafﬁc data from 3 web
servers in Ebates.
In order to build models of normal behavior and detect
deviations from that model, one needs a representative sam-
ple of the HTTP trafﬁc to a site. Additionally, there needs
to be enough such trafﬁc so that statistical techniques can
be effectively applied. To investigate the behavior of our
algorithms with smaller sample sizes, we performed exper-
iments where we randomly subsampled the HTTP log and
analyzed the ﬁrst three days of data set 1 (containing three
anomalies as described on page 6). By using just 5% of all
available data (approximately 12 thousand requests a day),
we still obtained the same results as when using all trafﬁc
from the 3 web servers.
In our Ebates experiments, we model the frequencies of
the 40 most frequently accessed pages on the web site. Even
though the Ebates users hit several thousand distinct pages
each week, hits to just the top 40 pages covered about 98%
of all trafﬁc. We decided to model just these 40 pages under
the assumption that any signiﬁcant problem would affect
these pages relatively quickly. For web sites with a broader
distribution of hits, there should be no difﬁcultly in model-
ing more pages as necessary.
In summary, we make very few assumptions about the
behavior of users and believe that this approach can be ap-
plied to an arbitrary Web application.
6. Related Work
Web Usage Mining (as described in [13], for example) is
a large and active ﬁeld. These techniques have been applied
to a variety of areas, but we believe we are the ﬁrst to ex-
ploretheiruseinapplicationfailuredetectionanddiagnosis.
Kallepalli and Tian [9] employ a form of hidden Markov
Models to learn user behavior from web logs, but their fo-
cus is on building an effective test suite rather than real-time
problem detection and localization. Commercial products
for monitoring applications and their software and hardware
platforms, such as IBM Tivoli [8], HP OpenView [7], and
Altaworks Panorama [1], focus on system and internal ap-
plicationmetricsratherthan changesinuserbehavior todis-
cover failures.
Pinpoint [3, 11] employs anomaly detection methods for
problem detection and root-cause analysis in distributed ap-
plications. While their approach involves instrumenting the
application and/or middleware to discover patterns in ap-
plication component dependencies, our approach uses only
genericHTTPlogsandtreatsthestructureoftheapplication
as a black box.
Cohen et al. [5] have applied an augmented type of
Bayesian network to the problem of metric attribution: de-
termining which low-level system properties (CPU load,
swap activity, etc.) are most correlated with high-level be-
haviors such as performance problems. Like us, they se-
lected a Bayesian network because its property of inter-
pretability allows the network to be used for localization.7. Future Work
Ebates has expressed interest in deploying our visualiza-
tion tools on live data and in working with us to develop a
better “ground truth” for evaluation. However, our experi-
ence suggests that a 100% accurate ground truth might be
unrealistic, soweareintheprocessofobtainingsimilardata
sets from two other companies to repeat our experiments.
We want to incorporate real-time feedback from the op-
erator into our models and produce more informed warn-
ings. For example, if the current long-term anomaly rep-
resents a normal behavior, the operator should be able to
specify that this is actually the new normal behavior. On
the other hand, if the recent anomaly represented a normal
behavior (e.g., page update), we shouldn’t report a warn-
ing the next time a similar anomaly appears. Also, we are
currently extending our models of web trafﬁc to capture the
correlations between the frequencies of pages.
8. Conclusion
Notwithstanding the promise of statistical analysis tech-
niques for detecting and localizing Internet service fail-
ures, the judgment of experienced operators can help dis-
ambiguate conﬂicting warnings, resolve apparently spuri-
ous warnings, and interpret problems ﬂagged by such al-
gorithms. We showed that visualization combined with
anomaly detection and localization can help human opera-
tors bring their expertise and experience more efﬁciently to
bear on such problems, reducing detection time, diagnostic
effort, and the cost of classifying false positives.
In particular we detected anomalies in user trafﬁc to a
real mid-sized Internet site using Naive Bayes and the χ2-
test. Our techniques detected four out of six failures more
quickly than the site’s staff, and the visualization helped to
understand the types and sources of anomalies reported by
the algorithms.
There is a critical synergy between visualization and au-
tomatic detection from the perspective of the autonomic
computing. Many traditional visualization tools are based
on the organization of the system. In contrast, our tools
present information in a format that is useful to operators,
helping them monitor their system and allowing them to
rapidly decide whether the visualization tool works and is
helpful. From that foundation of trust, we then automati-
cally point to behaviors at certain times that we think are
suspicious using that same visualization format. The opera-
tors can then quickly decide whether or not these warnings
are useful.
Without a visualization tool, we believe it would have
taken scores of warnings for each operator to decide
whether or not he or she trusted the tool. Since the detector
and visualizer use the same metric, it makes it much easier
and faster for the operator to decide whether the warning is
a false positive. False positives thus become much cheaper;
they are either signiﬁcant behavior changes that operators
may want to know about anyway, or they can be easily ﬁl-
tered out manually and visually. Since visual checking is
quick, we may be able to afford a higher false positive rate
in practice.
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